

# **Converging Forces: Achieving Unity of Purpose in Multinational Peace Operations**

**A Monograph  
by  
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Multinational Peace Operations

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## ABSTRACT

CONVERGING FORCES: ACHIEVING UNITY OF PURPOSE IN MULTINATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS by Major Eric R. Price, United States Army, 47 pages.

The United States Army is tasked to fight and win the nation's wars and is fully equipped with the doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures to do so. The military peace operations of the 20<sup>th</sup> century have shown that the Army is less well equipped to "fight and win" under those circumstances.

Clausewitz described war as an extension of policy by other means. The military interventions of the late 20th century, while something short of war, exhibit those same characteristics. However, in these coalition-based operations competing national policies and priorities, and contingent equipment and skill sets, complicate the extension of policy into action.

The natural inclination of the Army planner tasked with executing a peace operation would be to turn to the principles of war, espoused by Antoine Henri de Jomini in the nineteenth century and formalized into doctrine the United States in the twentieth, since they are the cornerstone of Army doctrine. In this regard, however, the venerated principles of war have proven inadequate.

The United States military recognized these inadequacies and in 1995 introduced the principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW), but MOOTW is a very broad category of military operations, and each of the more specific operations it encompasses has its own unique set of problems. This is especially true in coalition peace operations where questions of consent, impartiality, restraint, and interoperability complicate even the simplest matters. Further, the principles of MOOTW can appear to the military planner more as conditions to be achieved rather than an operational approach to the conduct of peace operations.

Numerous symposiums, reports, and studies have attempted to identify and codify a set of fundamental principles for the conduct of coalition peace operations. A National Defense University (NDU) study of command arrangements for multinational peace operations examined the tensions between the principles of war and the nature of peace operations and suggested five fundamental principles of coalition peace operations – unity of purpose, consensus planning, simplicity, adaptive control, and transparency. The principles, derived from the principles of war, are not mere conditions to be achieved, but are a methodology for successfully conducting coalition peace operations.

Given the increasing frequency with which the Army is called to participate in coalition peace operations, it must develop doctrine to support the execution of these missions, and to serve as a basis for training leaders in methods for adapting to this complex environment. These principles are a beginning to that doctrine.

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## PROLOGUE

*"Every great mistake has a halfway moment, a split second when it can be recalled and perhaps remedied."*

*- Pearl S. Buck*

Clausewitz described war as an extension of policy by other means. The military interventions of the late 20th century, while something short of war, exhibit those same characteristics. However, in multinational operations competing national policies and priorities, and contingent equipment and skill sets, complicate the extension of policy into action. As globalization leads more and more to operations that are coalition-based, planners have to take into consideration the impacts of the differing national policies, priorities, and skill sets on the successful execution of multinational operations. This is especially true in peace operations where questions of consent, impartiality, restraint, and interoperability complicate even the simplest matters.

This paper focuses on the challenges of achieving what Drs. David Alberts and Richard Hayes of the National Defense University called “unity of purpose”<sup>4</sup> in a coalition environment, and how the challenge to do so ultimately influences the success of military operations. Their examination of command and control arrangements for peace operations examined in part the tensions between the principles of war and the nature of peace operations.

United States military doctrine has attempted to overcome these tensions by developing principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW) and fundamentals of peace operations to serve as a guide to those operations short of combat. While these principles of war and MOOTW are useful to the military planner, the principles for coalition peace operations recommended by Drs. Alberts and Hayes distill those many doctrinal principles down to five critical and realistic principles that specifically address the needs of coalition peace operations. Although this particular portion of their work encompassed only a few short passages, it was their concept of principles for coalition peace operations that inspired the story that follows.

The story is presented in a style similar to that venerable military classic, *The Defense of Duffer's Drift* by Sir Ernest D. Swinton, with the recommended principles of coalition peace operations making up the lessons revealed in each of the dreams.

## CHAPTER ONE

# INTRODUCTION

*"We make war that we may live in peace."*

*- Aristotle*

The world looks peaceful at thirty-two thousand feet. Of course, that view is deceiving. The briefing in Heidelberg had provided a far different picture than that portrayed by the tranquil hills sweeping by the window. I lowered the shade and let my eyes readjust to the artificial light of the airplane's cabin, and again flipped open the file on Thrace.

Thrace. When word of the mission came down, all I vaguely remembered of Thrace was from my ancient history classes in college. I had no idea that it still existed as a region of Greece even today. Therefore, before our deployment, I spent some time in the library trying to understand the significance of Thrace to the modern world. I did not expect to find much about what was now merely a region of modern Greece, but I did manage to find out that Thrace was social powder keg, and one that had been smoldering for the last hundred years. Like its Balkan neighbors to the north, Thrace would require military intervention. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would be the force provider.

The first few months had gone well for the Task Force Iron, my unit, which was the headquarters of the Multinational Brigade West and had the largest mission within Stabilization Force-Thrace (SFORTH). I feared it could not last, and that fear was confirmed when the Old Man told me two days ago that I would accompany him to Heidelberg for an azimuth check with the Commander, United States European Command (USEUCOM). The meetings there provided me with good insight on the political considerations that go into this type of mission, but before the meeting was over, it was clear that the focus of our mission was about to change and this change would bring about new challenges for our command. To understand these changes, I guess it is important to go back to the beginning.



**Figure 1. The Thracian region of eastern Greece.<sup>2</sup>**

Thrace lies at the southeastern tip of the Balkan Peninsula, and judging by the literature, it seemed that everybody in the region – Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and the Ottomans – had battled over it. Although Bulgaria controlled most of Thrace at the end of First Balkan War, the area was eventually granted to Greece at the close of the First World War. A peace treaty was signed in 1923, after a failed attempt by Greece to invade the Turkish mainland, which basically fixed the borders as they are today, which left the Kingdom of Greece with a goodly portion of Thrace, at least up to the Maritsa River in the east, while the Turks retained everything from the Maritsa to the Dardanelles. In the process, Greece ended up with about 100,000 Turks in Thrace, while the Turks ended up with a similar number of Greeks. As part of the peace treaty, both sides agreed to grant and protect the rights of these minority groups within their borders.<sup>3</sup>

Since that time, according to the NATO report in my lap, the reciprocal treatment of the Greek and Turkish minority groups largely reflected the state of relations between the two countries. Those relations, while cordial at first, went steadily downhill after Cyprus' Greek majority tried to break free from British colonial rule in the 1950s, and lashed out at the Turkish

Cypriot minority in the process. The violence eventually spread to both Turkey and Greece, with each government making their own Greek or Turkish minorities to suffer tit-for-tat for any actions taken by the other. Beginning in the mid 1950s, for example, the Greek government systematically deprived the Turkish minority in Thrace of their citizenship and expropriated their property. The Turkish government soon followed suit with their Greek minorities in Istanbul.<sup>4</sup> Things did eventually get better for the ethnic Turks in Thrace, in the early 1990s, as the Greeks sought to bring themselves in line with European Union standards. Unfortunately, the world events of the last decade set the stage for another cycle of anti-Turkish violence in Thrace.

I rubbed my eyes, lifted the shade, and looked back out the window. There was very little to see now as night had fallen so I turned my attention back to the NATO report.

According to NATO's estimates, the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, along with the continued disputes between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and maritime rights in the Aegean, led to an ever-increasing paranoia about Greek national security. In particular, there was a concern about possible Turkish designs on Thrace. "For chrissakes," quipped one of the analysts back in Heidelberg, "they've been in a huff over Macedonia's use of the name Macedonia and their use of Philip's "Star of Vergina" emblem on the Macedonian flag for damn near fifteen years now! It doesn't take much for the Greeks to feel threatened." Indeed, Greece had been so concerned about the unraveling of the Balkans that they had chosen to support Serbia's iron rule rather than go along with the rest of NATO in support of the Bosnian Muslims.<sup>5</sup> This position further damaged the relationship between Greece and Turkey. However, events surrounding Cyprus threatened to breach permanently the uneasy peace between the two countries.<sup>6</sup>

In the spring of 2003, Greece successfully managed to lobby within the European Union (EU) to exclude Turkey from consideration for admission into the EU the following year, while also lobbying successfully to vote on the admission of a divided Cyprus. Turkey began to believe that admission to the EU was nothing but a dream. With its hopes of expanded free trade and

accelerated economic growth dashed, the religiously conservative government, which took power in 2002, began abolishing many of the social reforms made over the previous decade while decrying the admission of Cyprus as a *casus belli* and increasing its threats to annex Northern Cyprus.

The situation reached a climax in the fall of 2003. The United Nations proposed a new peace plan for Cyprus that would create two distinct and independent republics, each with ties to its “mother country”. Turkey readily agreed but the Greeks required significant diplomatic pressure from the US, NATO, and the EU before finally going along. The final treaty was signed in the spring of 2004 and afterwards, the UN formally partitioned Cyprus into two countries – the Republic of Cyprus in the south and the Republic of Northern Cyprus in the north. The UN installed a transitional government in the north, supervised national elections and finally turned over executive control to the Prime Minister of Northern Cyprus in January of 2005.

It would be a mistake to think that this somehow eased tensions in the region. Instead, the Greeks assumed that the Turks would not forgive or forget their efforts to keep Turkey out of the EU. Moreover, in a wave of Turkish nationalism that followed the EU debacle, there was a lot of rhetoric from Turkish extremist groups, in particular the Hizballah<sup>7</sup>, operating out of Meric, Turkey, advocating the armed liberation of the ‘the oppressed Turks’ of Thrace. Around this same time, the *Bati Trakya* (BT)<sup>8</sup>, a Turkish group in Thrace, stepped up its activities against the local government and police, mostly through passive resistance. All of these events simply fed Greek paranoia and caused the government to crack down on their Muslim minority.

In late March, local governments began closing Turkish-owned businesses, confiscating property, and enforcing old laws that prohibited Turkish language and free religious practice. The government dismissed large numbers of ethnic Turks from their jobs, and Greek special police forces, the *Elliniki Astinomia* or EL.AS, began rounding up unemployed Turkish males for deportation. Although the BT attempted to resist passively, it was clear from the hard line taken by the Greek government, that the Greeks were serious. The Greek government ignored calls

from the international community for restraint and instead stepped up its deportation efforts. In only three weeks, upwards of 100 Hizballah operatives had crossed the border, bringing in weapons to train BT members in insurgency operations. Within six weeks, the BT was conducting attacks on Greek police facilities and governmental offices in Evros, the westernmost Prefecture of Thrace.<sup>9</sup>

Many human rights groups, as well as the UN, the EU and the Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) watched with growing horror as the situation in Thrace continued to worsen. Finally, in May, Turkey massed its forces on the Maritsa and threatened to intervene militarily to prevent the “ethnic cleansing” of Thrace and as a result, Greece formally asked NATO to intervene. After receiving assurances of cooperation from both Greece and Turkey, and with the blessings of the UN Security Council, NATO sent Stabilization Force-Thrace (SFORTH), a Multinational Joint Task Force, to conduct peacekeeping operations in June 2005.

SFORTH’s ground forces consisted of two Multinational Brigades (MNB) under the command and control of Commander SFORTH (COMSFORTH). MNB-East, headed by a French Brigade, had a straightforward mission – deploy along the eastern side of the Maritsa River, and monitor Turkish forces there to ensure there was no incursion into Greek territory. MNB-West, led by my brigade, on the other hand, had a complex set of tasks including maintaining civil law and order, supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure, supporting the re-establishment of basic civil administrative functions, assuring the safe and unimpeded return of any refugees that had left the area, and finally, promoting human rights in the region.

Things had gone smoothly for the first two months, perhaps too smoothly. The Turkish Army seemed more than happy to stay on their side of the Maritsa River (or Meric River as the Turks called it) and let the French handle any problems along the border, of which there were few other than interdicting potential insurgents from the Hizballah trying to cross the river into Greece. The Greek government and military had also cooperated, especially by withdrawing the EL.AS, despite their concerns about internal security. Even the BT was quiet during those early

weeks. It seemed that all sides were willing to cool down and give the peace talks in Brussels a chance to work. In August, things began to change.



**Figure 2. Thrace.**

After a month of intense negotiations, the peace talks had not gone anywhere. Both Turkey and Greece staunchly defended their own internal security interests, and as a result, could not agree on issues of repatriation, civil protections of minorities, or methods to secure their common border. It seems the BT and the Hizballah had gotten the idea that nothing would change, and again began conducting limited attacks against the national police forces.

The USEUCOM Commander told us during our meeting in Heidelberg that there had been indicators that the Hizballah were planning some sort of action directed against TF Iron. We were to expect orders at some point in the future to act against Hizballah activities in Thrace.

That information came in mid-August, when word came down to the MNB-West through USEUCOM channels that the Central Intelligence Agency had received information on the location of three BT heavy weapons caches near the ancient town of Soufli. Further, the CIA's source indicated that the Hizballah was planning to assist the BT in using these weapons to attack NATO forces. Thus far, the Hizballah had not actively engaged in military operations inside

Thrace beyond providing arms and training to the BT. For the BT's part, they had focused their acts on the local government in Evros and the national police forces. If this report was to be believed, the situation was about to take a dramatic turn.



**Figure 3. Soufli weapons cache sites.**

Because the CIA's source was well placed in the hierarchy of the Hizballah, we were not allowed to release information about the Hizballah's involvement when we passed the information back through NATO channels, or to our subordinate coalition elements. Shortly after we had reported this development up through SFORTH channels, the word came from COMSFORTH that MNB-West would be given the mission to seize and destroy the weapons.

It was while mulling over the latest developments that I drifted off into an uncomfortable sleep and found myself beset by a series of nightmares. In each of these dreams, it seems that only I was vaguely aware that something had proceeded before. However, I could remember only the lessons from the previous dreams, and not the details of the events that created them.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE FIRST DREAM

*"Courage is what it takes to stand up and speak;  
courage is also what it takes to sit down and listen."*

*- Winston Churchill*

The mission and guidance from COMSFORTH was clear – seize the three weapons caches belonging to the BT and turn the weapons over to the SFORTH weapons team for destruction. After receiving the mission, the MNB-West planning staff began the crisis action planning process.

Multinational organizations generally organize themselves under a “lead nation” command structure. In this type of structure, coalition members subordinate their forces to a single partner, although those governments generally do not fully relinquish control of their supplied forces.<sup>10</sup> This was this type of command structure used during NATO operations in Kosovo, the primary blueprint for operations in Thrace. This command structure has its problems, however, primarily because of the parallel chains of command that can exist within each of the national contingents, and the potential for guidance from their national authorities to conflict with operational directives generated within the organization. U.S. joint doctrine points out the desirability of ensuring that the headquarters is representative of the entire coalition by augmenting the headquarters with representatives from coalition members as a way of mitigating problems with parallel chains of command.<sup>11</sup> While this is common at higher levels in multinational organizations, and was the case for the COMSFORTH headquarters, lower level organizations usually do not organize this way due to smaller numbers of available personnel and equipment.

Such was the case with the Task Force Iron and the Multinational Brigade – West. The United States was the lead nation for the MNB-West and as such, the bulk of the MNB staff came from Task Force Iron. TF Iron was made up of the headquarters and one infantry battalion

from the First Brigade of the First Armored Division, along with the additional personnel from the brigade's other battalions to fill out shortages and augmentations from USEUCOM and the Department of Defense to expand the brigade's communications, logistics and intelligence capabilities. The coalition infantry battalions and separate companies each provided a minimum of two liaison officers to the MBN headquarters whose role was largely to pass information between the brigade headquarters and those, and to answer any questions on coalition member capabilities during planning.


The initial concern of TF Iron planning staff was the issue of impartiality. Impartiality was the first in a list of fundamentals identified in joint doctrine, which hung on a sheet of butcher paper in the plans shop. In addition to impartiality, joint doctrine identifies seven other fundamentals of peace operations: firmness, integration, consent, freedom of movement, anticipation, and clarity of intention.<sup>12</sup> However, the staff had circled the word "impartiality" in red, and it was here that they focused their efforts.

The TF Iron planning staff saw the problem as how to seize weapons destined for the BT while maintaining an air of impartiality. The BT would certainly argue that they were armed only to defend themselves against repression from the local government and special police. The fear was that seizing the BT's weapons would appear to favor the Greek government in its ability to continue terrorize its Muslim population, and thus would escalate tensions between the two, and possibly cause the BT to turn against SFORTH. It was important to maintain the consent of the parties involved and prevent the mission from escalating to peace enforcement. However, at the same time, USEUCOM's intelligence suggested that the BT might be planning operations against SFORTH anyway, and the brigade could not wait for such an attack before taking action. It was this idea that gave the planning staff their out.

The guidance from USEUCOM suggested that the MNB apprehend the suspected Hizballah members, if possible, for questioning by American intelligence specialists regarding Hizballah's association with other terror organizations. The staff quickly seized on this idea as a

way to maintain a sense of impartiality by making the weapons seizure a police action associated with the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and not targeted at the BT in particular. Because the coalition partners could not be told of the Hizballah involvement, they would simply be told that personnel at the sites were potentially planning terrorist activities and were thus to be treated as potential terrorists.

The final plan was to send one company of infantry to each of the three weapons sites, Objectives HOMER, ODYSSEY, and ILIAD, to conduct simultaneous raids on those sites and apprehend any personnel located therein. The brigade would turn over captured weapons and ammunition to the SFORTH special weapons detail for destruction. The brigade would also turn over any BT detainees to the Joint Military Commission (JMC) for final disposition, while the brigade would hold any detainees identified as Hizballah members until they could be turned over to USEUCOM.



**Figure 4. The first plan.**

It was clear shortly after the order went out that the Pakistani and Italian commanders were hesitant to cooperate. Each of the two nations provided a battalion of motorized infantry to the MNB, and each had the mission to seize one of the weapons sites with a company-sized

element from their contingent. Neither objected to the mission of seizing weapons at the site, but neither was willing to apprehend persons at the sites for interrogation by American intelligence operatives. Their reasoning was that NATO had not authorized the apprehensions. Further, many of the NATO members had openly criticized America's establishment of the now permanent High Security Administration Facility (HISAF) at Guantanamo Bay<sup>13</sup> to handle prisoners of the Global War on Terrorism, largely because the U.S. routinely transferred suspected terrorists to HISAF for interrogation and imprisonment, extradition laws notwithstanding. Although NATO had not authorized the apprehensions, neither COMSFORTH nor EUSCOM countermanded the order.

The Pakistanis and Italians further argued that the BT had not been operating as a terrorist organization, but rather as an insurgency, and thus the best way to thwart them was to remove their cause, namely, persecution and civil rights violations by the EL.AS and the Greek government. Both commanders were also concerned that treating the BT like terrorists might further legitimize their efforts, and more importantly, might draw the ire of the Turkish Government and potentially the involvement of the Turkish military. Unfortunately, we could not inform the Pakistanis and Italians of the real target, Hizballah, because of the classification level.

The commander quickly grew impatient with these political considerations. Because of the command structure, neither the Pakistanis nor Italians had been directly involved in the planning. As a result, the staff had not been aware of or addressed the concerns of the Pakistanis or Italians. Given the window of opportunity to seize the weapons, and potentially the Hizballah members before they dispersed into the countryside, there was little time to negotiate on the participation of the coalition infantry.

The brigade commander met with the Pakistani and Italian commanders and laid out the facts as best he could, and gave them additional time to consult with their governments, but made it clear that based on the intelligence reports, the window of opportunity to seize these weapons before their distribution into the countryside was limited. He also made it clear that if they could

not execute the mission, the Americans would have to do it alone, which could result in the reduction of Pakistani and Italian “presence” in future missions. Later that day, the Italian government agreed to the contested portions of the mission. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, offered to consider the implications of turning over any suspects to the Americans “at such time as any were apprehended”. For the Brigade commander, this was good enough, and the battalions began their preparations for execution.

The scene suddenly moved forward to the day the raid of the raids. Nervous anticipation filled the entire headquarters. I found myself pacing nervously in the command center, an uneasy feeling in the pit of my stomach. The three companies, one American, one Pakistani, and one Italian, moved from their staging areas along separate routes to the three locations near Soufli in order to conduct the raids simultaneously. At 0800 local time, the companies were in position and the raids commenced.

The Americans had little trouble at Objective HOMER north of the Soufli. The company cordoned the area with a platoon of military police, and stormed the dilapidated building, surprising six lightly armed militants, all of whom were apparently members of the BT. Through their efforts, the Americans seized more than 200 light and heavy weapons, and 20 mortars, plus more than fifty-five crates of ammunition.

Stiff resistance at Objective ODYSSEY to the east of the town surprised the Italians. When they assaulted the small warehouse with their infantry, they caught a group of men loading a truck in the back. All of the men were well armed, and shooting quickly broke out. The suspects quickly pinned the Italians down and managed to get away, while the Italians suffered two wounded. The Italians seized a mixture of 250 light and heavy weapons, 30 mortars, and 30 crates of ammunition, and killed two of the suspects.

The Pakistani company found itself in a small battle at Objective ILIAD south of Soufli. There they found about a half dozen suspects inside the building, and when the Pakistani infantry attempted to enter, a firefight broke out. The commotion quickly drew a large crowd. Within a

half an hour, the crowd began throwing rocks and bottles at the Pakistanis, seeing them as the belligerents. As the crowd grew, the Pakistanis felt their position was untenable because the target was located on a dead end road and withdrew without seizing any weapons. In the melee, the Pakistanis had five soldiers injured by weapons fire or flying debris.

The day had ended with roughly 500 weapons seized and almost 4 tons of ammunition and other munitions, yet only 6 detainees. Though the weapons were a substantial gain for SFORTH, it was hardly the success the MNB was looking for.

The operations officer gathered the planning staff together afterwards to try to conduct a post mortem on the operation and figure out what went wrong. A member of the effects cell stated flatly that one of the battalion commanders should have commanded the overall operation, and that in not doing so, the staff had violated the principle of unity of command. This led to a spirited discussion on unity of command and its application in peace operations.

Our staff, Americans all, had been raised on the “Jominian” principles of war: mass, objective, offensive, surprise, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, and simplicity. U.S. Army doctrine describes unity of command as ensuring for every objective a unity of effort under one responsible commander.<sup>14</sup> However, unity of command is almost impossible in an organization where the commander does not have full command authority over his subordinate units. Army doctrine answers the question of unity command by recommending that commanders concentrate on achieving unity of effort in multinational operations.

Unity of effort is one of the six principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW) in U.S. joint doctrine, with the others being objective, security, legitimacy, perseverance, and restraint. Doctrine describes unity of effort as ensuring all means are directed to a common purpose.<sup>15</sup> However, the doctrine relating to MOOTW also discusses the difficulty of achieving unity of effort within multination organizations because of competing national interests and differing views on the nature of the objective. The UN also identifies unity of effort

as one of its principles of peacekeeping operations, along with objectives, perseverance, credibility, freedom of movement, flexibility, and initiative.<sup>16</sup>

On its surface, unity of effort would seem the more appropriate of the two options. However, current doctrine essentially measures the degree to which you achieve unity of effort by action. There are many instances in multinational operations where action by one member or another simply is not possible due to the competing national interests of the parties involved. What may be possible however, even with a lack of action by a member, is support for the overall purpose. An example came to mind from the operations in Kosovo, when the commander of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, British General Sir Michael Jackson, refused the order from the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, American General Wesley Clark, to block Russian access to the airport in Pristina at the beginning of operations.<sup>17</sup> The United Kingdom clearly supported the intended ends of military action in Kosovo, but disagreed pointedly on the net effect of blocking the Russians.

From these ruminations and the planning staff's discussion it was clear to me that the issue was not about unity of command or unity of effort, but something even broader – unity of purpose.

*In peacekeeping operations, coalitions must strive achieve unity of purpose.* That is, coalitions must seek at least to agree on the ends, even when they cannot agree on the ways and means for achieving those ends. In this way, coalition elements will find ways to contribute to operation that are consistent with both the desired ends and with their own national policy, even when at times these contributions may be moral rather than physical.

Our approach to the mission had complicated the issue for our coalition partners. By tasking our subordinate coalition contingents with missions that might conflict with guidance from their national authorities, we had unintentionally involved them in the U.S.-led global war on terrorism, something outside the mandate for which they had deployed. It reminded me of operations in Somalia in the early nineties, when coalition contingents disagreed with some of the

changing aims of the operation, and with the means employed by the United States, resulting in incredible difficulty in controlling the UN troops and ultimately contributed to a failure of that mission. There, the United States aggressively pursued its mandate to restore order, which increased anti-U.S. and anti-UN sentiments. It ultimately created a situation so dangerous that contingent commanders would refuse to deploy to certain areas based on guidance from their capitals, and in some instances, coalition members negotiated independently with the Somali clans for protection at the expense of the larger mission.<sup>18</sup>

In our case, it was almost as if neither the Pakistanis nor the Italians had pressed their fights against the BT, potentially because they had not fully “bought in” to the mission, given their concerns about the apprehensions. Had we consulted the contingent commanders as part of the planning process, there would have been additional time to either build support for the mission as it stood, make a decision to use American forces only, or change some of the ancillary objectives to make the mission politically acceptable to the coalition partners. Unity of purpose ultimately requires relationships that are consultative than directive in nature, both in the military and diplomatic realms. Coalitions achieve unity of purpose only through consensus building, which led me to a second lesson.

*In order to achieve unity of purpose, multinational organizations have to plan through collaboration and consensus, rather than mere directives.* Because coalition members come into multination operations with constraints that are imposed by their governments, they must be engaged in the planning process at all levels to minimize conflicts between the plans developed and their national interests. Each of our coalition members came to the operation with constraints imposed by their governments, and because they were not involved in the planning process from the start, there were bound to be conflicts in the plan. The MNB needed to integrate the coalition partners into the headquarters staff structure instead of as mere liaisons, and then engage them in the planning of the raids from the very beginning. By fully integrating the staff, the MNB commander would have not only the source of expertise on the capabilities of the coalition

members, but also a broader base of experience and the ability develop consensus throughout the decision-making process. Additionally, coalition concerns would be addressed as part of the planning process, and not afterwards, thereby reducing the need to adjust completed plans based on those concerns.

As I sat and listened to the discussion, it occurred to me that there is another critical component of consensus planning – the sharing of intelligence. Throughout the mission, we had limited the intelligence we shared with the other coalition members, primarily out of a need to protect capabilities and sources. While this is understandable, and indeed necessary, it is essential to share intelligence across the multinational coalition so that each member can make informed decisions when planning operations. In order to do that, a coalition organization should establish an intelligence coordination center, which is manned by representative members of the coalition. This coordination center would be the focal point for the collection, cross-referencing, and dissemination of intelligence information across the multinational force. Coalition members would need to sanitize information rapidly, where required due to classification and source restrictions, as intelligence is perishable. Each coalition member would filter protected sources, and restricted information before forwarding that information through the coordination center. Additionally, each coalition element would maintain its own, independent intelligence center for individual analysis, and the analysis of compartmentalized information.

It was while trying to digest the significance of these two lessons that I had another dream.

## CHAPTER THREE

# THE SECOND DREAM

*"There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact."*

*- Sir Arthur Conan Doyle*

I found myself again at the MNB-West headquarters in Alexandroupolis, my head still buzzing from the lessons of “unity of purpose” and “consensus planning”, but no recollection of exactly what they might mean to my current circumstance. I walked into the plans shop and found the staff working on the mission as previously described.

The bulk of both the planning and operations staffs came from TF Iron, but members of the coalition occupied positions in each of the planning and operational staff sections in an integrated staff structure which had jelled quite well over the last two months. Integrated staffs are not a doctrinal requirement in lead nation multinational organizations, but are recommended by both joint and Army doctrine. Over the course of the past two months, the brigade had struggled through many systems interoperability issues, as well as the normal doctrinal struggles that accompany the combining of forces from many nations. Computer systems and communications connectivity problems proved to be the biggest problem in collaborative planning efforts, while doctrinal issues were quickly cleared up after a little clarification.

To support this multinational planning effort, the brigade had established an Intelligence coordination center<sup>19</sup>, which received the filtered intelligence reports from each of the coalition elements, cross-referenced and corroborated the information, and then in turn passed to the MNB’s intelligence section for analysis. Here too there were many interoperability issues, but the ICC staff made great efforts to make the information sharing work.

As the planning staff tackled the problem of planning operations to seize the weapons caches at Soufli, they relied heavily on the consolidated intelligence reports produced by the Intelligence Coordination Center, as well as the information provided by U.S. national resources

through USEUCOM. The information from USEUCOM regarding Hizballah involvement in the weapons caches was classified NOFORN however, and was not directly shared with the members of the coalition. Instead, the full staff was made aware that intelligence indicated that some of the BT might be forming cells which would use the weapons in terrorist strikes against SFORTH forces. For that reason, I simply told the staff that U.S. intelligence agencies wanted to question any suspected terror suspects apprehended as part of the operation.

The staff struggled initially with how to maintain the perception of impartiality during the weapons seizure. The weapons were destined for the Muslim paramilitaries, and by seizing them, it might appear that we were helping the Greek government to continue its persecution of its Muslim population. Because it was important to maintain the consent of both the Greeks and the BT, impartiality was essential. As the discussion continued, one of the Italian officers offered that perhaps credibility, one of the UN's principles of peace operations, or legitimacy in the U.S. lexicon, was more important in this mission than impartiality. If the weapons were indeed destined for use against SFORTH, it was critical to take action both as a force protection measure and in order to maintain the credibility of the force. At the same time, this had to be done in a manner that would be perceived as impartial by both sides.


That is why the Pakistanis voiced loud objections to the notion of possibly turning over detainees for questioning by American intelligence operatives. To balance the need for both credibility and impartiality, the officer suggested any detained persons be turned over to the Joint Military Commission (JMC) who was responsible for adjudicating issues with the military technical agreement, so that they could determine their final disposition. The recommendation was not exactly contrary to the guidance TF Iron had received from USEUCOM, but might raise issues in the U.S. chain of command. The MNB commander decided to float the idea back up through both U.S. and SFORTH channels. The SFORTH and USEUCOM commanders both agreed with the recommendation, with USEUCOM deciding that the U.S. could press its case for

access to any Hizballah members directly through NATO. Their concurrence was well timed, as time was too short to argue the issue any further.

The Pakistanis were still concerned about the potential that the “terrorist” label might be slapped on the BT, which as of yet had not conducted any terrorist activities, choosing instead to conduct insurgency operations directed at government forces. Both commanders were also concerned that treating the BT like terrorists might legitimize future efforts, and more importantly, might draw the ire of the Turkish Government and potentially the involvement of the Turkish military. Because of these concerns, the plan was adjusted to clearly articulate that persons were to be detained for criminal activity in violation of the Military Technical Agreement (i.e. weapons violations), and that detained persons would be turned over to the JMC for disposition. The words “terrorism” and “terrorist” were not used.

None on the staff expected any serious problems during the operation. Even if we were dealing with militant members of the BT, the facts were that the collection and destruction of weapons had been an integral part of the operation to date. However, most of the earlier weapons had been collected through voluntary weapons buy-back programs or the seizure of illegal arms during routine patrols. This was after all, a permissive environment, with both sides agreeing to the presence of the NATO-led SFORTH. As such, there had been few purely military operations during the deployment because the deterrence of violence had been achieved mostly through the mere presence of the coalition. Then again, this operation would be the first direct military action against the BT, and potentially the Hizballah.

The staff agreed upon a final plan that was essentially the same as that described in the previous dream – three infantry companies conducting raids simultaneously on each of the three weapons sites – except that detainees would be turned over to the JMC for final disposition. For the duration of the operation, each of the companies would report through their battalions to the MNB. In addition, each of the companies was authorized to coordinate their actions directly with the others.



**Figure 5. The second plan.**

Suddenly, the scene shifted and I was in the operations center listening to chatter on the radio as the companies left their staging areas to execute the raids. There was a palpable tension in the room, as staff officers listened intently for any signs of trouble. It would not take long for those signs to appear.

The three companies, moved out from their staging areas along separate routes to the three locations near Soufli in order to conduct the raids simultaneously. The movements were planned such that each company would arrive at its target at the same time. Unfortunately, the Americans were delayed by mechanical problems while making their sweeping movement around to the north, and asked the other two companies to hold short of their objectives. Because of communications interoperability issues, this request was sent over a non-encrypted radio net, and must have been intercepted by both Greek and BT sympathizers because when forces arrived at the eastern and southern target buildings, large crowds had already gathered.

The Americans immediately deployed their military police platoon to disperse a smaller crowd at Objective HOMER in the north and to cordon the area. By now, whoever was in the building had some idea of what was going on making an all out assault on the building ill

advised. The infantry instead surrounded the building and called for any occupants inside to come out. The immediate response was small arms fire and the company spent the next twenty minutes clearing the building. In the process, the American infantry detained four BT suspects and killed two others, while suffering two wounded infantrymen.

In the meantime, the crowd had increased dramatically, and the MPs were having difficulty controlling access to the area. They called back to their battalion to request that the MNB release the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to assist, but they were not the only ones in trouble. Instead, the Americans were forced to withdraw with their detainees in tow. They managed to load the thirty mortars into their combat vehicles, but had to leave the other weapons and ammunition behind.

The Italians faced even more resistance at Objective ODYSSEY east of the town, at which a crowd of over three hundred civilians had gathered. As they approached the area, they saw a truck that appeared to be carrying several men and crates, speeding away from the warehouse to the north. They deployed one platoon to create a cordon around the small warehouse and attempt to keep the crowd at bay. The second platoon entered and cleared the building, finding a large cache of weapons, but no people. The company commander called in the support vehicles and began loading the weapons and munitions.

It was at this point that the crowd became unruly. It appeared that there were in fact two crowds, one made up of local Greeks, and one made up of ethnic Turks. Once it became clear what was going on at the site, the two crowds began shouting and jeering one another, apparently the Greeks were in favor of the actions of the Italian troops, while the Turks thought that the Italians were essentially attacking other Turks. The shouting eventually turned into shoving and finally fighting, with fists, sticks, and rocks as the weapons of choice. The Italian troops stood by and watched the melee, unclear as to how to react. The ROE called for the use of force only in self-defense, and the crowds were too busy going at each other to worry about the Italians. So

instead, the Italians continued maintain their perimeter around the warehouse and continued loading the support vehicles with the confiscated weapons.

When the weapons had been loaded and the Italians were ready to move, the commander called back to his battalion to get permission to use riot control agents to disperse the crowd blocking his way. That request had to be relayed to the MNB headquarters for approval. During the delay, the melee turned deadly, and rather than wait for approval, the Italian commander used tear gas to disperse the crowd. The infantry policed up three civilian casualties and raced back to their cantonment area. During the trip back, they received word that the request to use riot control agents was denied and they were to return to base.

It was clear from this that in the relaying of the request, the justification had somehow gotten lost in the translation.

A large crowd of angry locals also confronted the Pakistanis and attempted to deny them access to the area south of Soufli. The Pakistanis pushed through the crowd and used two of their infantry platoons and their vehicles to cordon the area. With the situation tense from the start, the third Pakistani platoon attempted to rush the building. As they entered through the front of the building, a group of armed men raced out from the side of the building firing their weapons. Soldiers from the infantry platoon waiting to enter turned and opened fire on the suspects. Four of the suspects were quickly wounded, but in the confusion, Pakistani fire also raked members of the crowd beyond, killing two and wounding three others. The infantry quickly subdued the other two suspects. The shooting had dispersed the crowd, and the Pakistanis, worried about the crowd's return, loaded up their troops and the five civilian casualties and returned to their cantonment area.

The day had ended with a few weapons seized and only six detainees. The cost to the MNB had been five soldiers wounded, an appalling eight civilian casualties, of whom four were dead, and what potentially amounted to a significant loss of credibility.

In the aftermath of the day's events, there were calls for a reevaluation of the SFORTH

presence in Thrace. The Greek government contended that if SFORTH could not protect the local populace from mob attack, then the EL.AS would. On the BT side, there were accusations of collusion by the SFORTH with the Greek government, as evidence by SFORTH attacks on ethnic Turk civilians.

The operations officer called together the planning staff to figure out what went wrong and collect recommendations for the commander on how to proceed with any potential follow-up mission.

The discussion immediately turned to command and control. Although the brigade authorized the companies to coordinate with one another directly, none had chosen to do so during the operation. Additionally, coordination with the MNB headquarters had to flow through the contingent battalions first, creating a significant delay. This was due largely to the various radio systems and procedures used by the different coalition members. The other problem, however, was in subtle cultural differences in the different militaries. As in the case of the Italians, the MNB had interpreted the request for use of riot control agents as a request of convenience, rather than one tied to an emergency situation. The Italians had not articulated the near-riot conditions that existed so the assumption was made that they, like the Americans, should simply avoid a conflict with the crowd by leaving the area.

Clearly there were both command and control issues here but the situation was more an issue of control than of command.

*Multinational peacekeeping operations should rely on an adaptive level of control to achieve unity of purpose, in order to overcome the physical limitations of multinational organizations.* The key to centralized decision-making is a higher volume of information and thus greater situational awareness at the higher headquarter. This in turn requires a higher level of detail in the situation reports submitted to higher. Unfortunately, multinational organizations tend to submit less rather than more information, because of differing systems of reporting and the sometimes-limited interoperability of the physical means of submitting those reports. These

limitations lend themselves to adaptive control arrangements rather than direct control. Adaptive control is possible only by understanding emerging situations and planning for a range of contingencies beforehand. Subordinates can then go out armed with an understanding of the range of possibilities and prepare to act decisively within that range.<sup>20</sup>

In contrast, the alternative, direct control, seeks to base decisions on the information of the moment, and as such requires greater immediate situational awareness, which inherently means greater information flow through highly connected communications systems.

Therefore, if decision-making must be more decentralized in multinational operations, the MNB's planning staff needed to explore a range of the potential reactions by both the BT/Hizballah and the local populace and accordingly. This meant that the MNB needed to focus less attention on the intelligence provided by national assets, which we were limited in sharing any way, and put our efforts into using less sensitive methods, such as human intelligence (HUMINT).<sup>21</sup>

Adaptive control also requires Rules of Engagement (ROE) that are clearly understood by all members of the coalition. The SFORTH ROE reflected the permissive nature of the environment in that they emphasized the use of minimum force. The SFORTH headquarters had formulated the rules, with recommended inputs from NATO and USEUCOM, and had worked effectively over the past two months, especially since there had been little resistance to the presence of SFORTH forces. The ROE certainly allowed for the appropriate force necessary to complete the mission, but the Italians had interpreted the ROE perhaps too strictly, as had happened in Haiti in 1996, when soldiers stood by while the Haitian military beat civilians because they believed the ROE did not allow them to intervene.<sup>22</sup>

*Unity of purpose in multinational operations is derived largely from simplicity – that is, plans must be developed with the training, doctrine, equipment, and culture of the coalition contingents in mind.* In our discussions, it became clear that the Pakistani company commander had not conducted this type of operation before and his company had not trained in conducting

police-type operations, and thus he felt uncomfortable executing what he described as a police action. The Italians on the other hand, were completely comfortable with the mission, but believed that three independent commands, using three different sets of equipment, three different languages, and potentially three different interpretations of the ROE was simply a recipe for disaster.

Simplicity is essential to achieving unity of purpose. In multinational operations, training, doctrine and equipment will not likely be uniform, but they must all be compatible in order to build consensus and achieve purpose. It is more than the simplicity of the Jominian principles of war. Yes, the brigade needed to develop simple, straightforward plans, clearly understood by all of the elements of the coalition, but additionally, the brigade needed to assign the appropriate forces, forces that were trained and equipped to handle them.

The staff agreed that the credibility of the coalition was at stake. For any follow-up operation, a force under a single command, and made up of forces fully capable of handling the anticipated range of actions in accordance with clearly understood ROE would be employed .

I struggled to fully grasp the significance of these two lessons, so overwhelmed was I by the utter failure of our force. The scene suddenly faded around me and I realized that it was yet another dream.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE THIRD DREAM

*"Speak clearly, if you speak at all;  
carve every word before you let it fall."*

*- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.*

Once again I found myself at the MNB-West headquarters, now armed with four lessons – unity of purpose, consensus planning and now adaptive control and simplicity – and a fresh sense of purpose. I entered the plans shop and gathered the planners around me with hopes of imbuing them with my feelings of confidence, as we tackled the planning for the mission as previously described.

The staff was organized as previously described, with all the challenges posed by varied equipment and doctrine.

As the planning staff tackled the problem of planning the mission, they relied heavily on the consolidated intelligence reports coming out of the intelligence coordination center, which focused on collecting and analyzing as much HUMINT as possible. HUMINT efforts attempted to get a feel for BT activities in the Soufli area, and to get a sense of the type of support being provided to BT by the local populace. The information collected so far indicated a sense of resentment of NATO, and indirectly SFORTH, on the part of the ethnic Turks because of the failure of the peace negotiations going on in Belgium. Through our contacts with the locals, particularly by the Pakistanis, it became clear that the Hizballah were indeed recruiting in Thrace and trying to build support to expand operations against not only the Greek government and national police forces, but also against the forces of SFORTH. This figured heavily in our planning.

The planning staff's effort focused on developing a plan that was designed as a police action, making it clear to the populace that the operation was targeted against lawlessness, not against a particular group. The staff was concerned about potential actions from the local

populace, which the intelligence staff expected to range from attempts to deny SFORTH access to the weapons sites to taking aggressive action against the force. This meant that the force needed to be organized with both a robust military capability to deter resistance by the civilians, and a robust police capability to handle the detention of any BT or Hizballah suspects, plus the detention of any civilians interfering with the mission.

The staff collectively agreed that a platoon of Italian carabinieri should accompany each of the three company-sized elements needed to execute simultaneous raids at the three locations around Soufli. The carabinieri were well trained in both military and law enforcement functions, and were ideally suited to the mission. Additionally, a U.S. military police platoon would co-locate with a fourth infantry company, which would be the QRF for the operation.

The staff hoped that none of the more serious actions by the local populace materialized but knew that since this was the coalition's first purely military act and was likely to involve members of the Hizballah as well as the BT, the situation could escalate very quickly.

As the staff began assigning troops to task, it decided that the Americans would take responsibility for the weapons site in the north, Objective HOMER, and that the Italians would take the other two, ODYSSEY in the east, and ILIAD in the south. The Pakistanis would form the QRF given their high level of infantry training. To aid in command and control, the companies would be under the command of the 1-6 Infantry Battalion, who would in turn report to the MNB. The MNB would provide Italian linguists to support both Italian companies and the 1-6 Infantry battalion headquarters, as well as Greek linguists to all four company elements. This arrangement ensured that there was an ability to communicate in dual languages between the companies and the battalion headquarters, which should prevent any misunderstandings as events unfolded.

Since the plan was designed as a law enforcement operation, both the plan and the special ROE developed to support it articulated clearly that persons were only to be detained in connection with the commitment of criminal activity. Although the USEUCOM guidance had indicated a desire to have detainees interviewed by American intelligence operatives, the staff

agreed to turn over detainees to the Joint Military Commission for final disposition in order to maintain the perception of impartiality. This would allow the JMC to use the resources of the SFORTH, NATO and USEUCOM to determine who should and who should not be given over to the Greek authorities.

The staff had developed a detailed and flexible plan, consistent with the aims and concerns of the coalition contingents; it had planned for redundancy in communications, and had organized the force to maximize its capabilities across a broad spectrum of contingencies. All seemed well and a sense of confidence surrounded the entire planning staff, myself included.



**Figure 6. The third plan.**

As before, I abruptly found myself standing in the back of the operations center waiting nervously with other members of the staff for the operation to begin.

The three companies, one American, and two Italian, along with their platoons of carabinieri moved along their separate routes to the three locations near Soufli. The 1-6 Infantry headquarters controlled their movements to ensure their simultaneous arrival at the target sites. At five until eight, each company began its raid.

In the north, the Americans moved in quickly to seal the area around HOMER using its three infantry platoons. The carabinieri, who are highly trained experts in riot control and organized crime, stormed the building and rapidly subdued the six occupants. The support trucks moved in and within a half an hour, all of the weapons had been loaded and the company was prepared to move. The company sent the carabinieri platoon and one infantry platoon to escort the transports back to the cantonment area, while the company-minus moved slowly along the main highway running south through Soufli, ready to assist either of the Italians in their operations to the south and east.

At ODYSSEY, east of Soufli, the Italian infantry platoons approached the small warehouse that was their target more cautiously. As the infantry moved to cordon the area, a group of armed men loading a truck behind the building spotted them. The men immediately began firing on the infantry, which drew the attention of the other infantry platoons and the carabinieri. While the carabinieri rushed the building to clear it of any suspects, a platoon of infantry swept around the building to take the suspects from the rear. As quickly as it began, it was over. Four suspects lay dead or dying and the other five were quickly captured. At least one of the suspects appeared to be a Turkish national.

Meanwhile, because the infantry had been drawn into the fight and had not completed securing the perimeter, a large and unruly crowd began to gather uncontrolled. The carabinieri moved to disperse the crowd, having their interpreters read instructions over a loudspeaker. In the meantime, one of the platoons began loading the support vehicles while the other two supported the carabinieri in maintaining the perimeter.

Just as it appeared that tensions were easing and the crowd was beginning to disperse, the American infantry from HOMER arrived, approaching the crowd from the rear. This created an initial panic in the crowd, who apparently thought that more soldiers had been called in because of their presence. As the crowd rapidly scattered, a few individuals began throwing rocks, sticks and bottles at the approaching Americans and the soldiers on the perimeter. The Americans

entered the perimeter and divided their efforts between reinforcing the perimeter and assisting in loading the confiscated weapons on the transports.

The crowd began to grow in size and grow more agitated. The troops hurried the loading of the weapons and ammunition and departed the area under a hail of rocks and bottles. They returned to the cantonment area with only minor injuries from flying debris.

If this had been the extent of the mission, then the staff would have concluded it to be at least a qualified success. It was regrettable that the locals near ODYSSEY had misinterpreted the actions of the approaching Americans but that could not be helped. Unfortunately, even greater problems were occurring at ILIAD in the south.

At ILIAD things had gone badly indeed. When the Italian infantry arrived at the target building, they stumbled onto a strange scene. There was a group of men dressed as commandos moving along the exterior of the building. The Italians, thinking these were militants reacting to their arrival, opened fire and cut down two of the suspects before the rest darted around the rear of the building. Two platoons quickly fanned out to surround the target while the carabinieri and one infantry platoon rushed forward. An intense firefight broke out and lasted almost five minutes before the “commandos” surrendered. It turned out that they were members of the EL.AS, conducting their own raid on a suspected BT weapons cache and safe house, and had thought that the firing had come from BT members or sympathizers.

The Italians immediately reported this situation back to the 1-6 operations center who forwarded the report to us. The MNB operations center came to life with a flurry of activity as staff members contacted COMSFORTH as well as working through civil-military channels to contact Evros government and police officials to ensure there were no other police raids being executed at the other two sites.

Meanwhile, the Italian carabinieri cleared the building, detaining six confused BT members, and confiscating more than 300 weapons, 35 mortars and 80 crates of ammunition. Disagreement broke out between the Italians and the EL.AS as to who would take custody of the

weapons and detainees. When the commander called back for clarification, the brigade directed that under no circumstances was he to turn either over to the EL.AS. The brigade continued to work the issue through civil-military channels and eventually the Greek authorities told the EL.AS to stand down.

The day had ended with over 800 weapons seized and almost 10 tons of ammunition and other munitions, as well as 17 detainees. The mission might have been categorized as a success, but the seizures and detentions had come at a very heavy price, one that threatened to jeopardize the entire mission.

Two events during the mission threatened to undo all the brigade had accomplished in the previous two months. The public quickly denounced the perceived ‘heavy-handedness’ of the Italians and Americans at Objective ODESSEY, and called for active resistance to future SFORTH operations. Worse than that, many of the civilians who had come out to see what had happened at Objective ILIAD had seen instead the EL.AS and Italian soldiers milling about outside the building, and concluded that SFORTH and the EL.AS were colluding with one another to strip the ethnic Turks of their rights. The media photographed this particular situation and those opposed to the presence of SFORTH made considerable political “hay” out of it. The apparent lack of impartiality had even influenced the peace negotiations in Belgium, with calls for a reassessment of NATO intervention in Thrace. Things were no better on the Greek side, where there were high-level protests lodged over the deaths of the two EL.AS officers.

The brigade had emphasized operational security to a degree that the operation was endangered by creating a situation where our forces had surprised not just the militants, but also the police and the community. Surprise<sup>23</sup>, another Jominian principle of war, is desirable on the battlefield. In peace operations however, surprise can run counter to the concept of legitimacy by creating situations in which the disputing parties, outside agencies, and or the public misconstrue the actions of the peacekeeping force, as was the case at Objective ODESSEY.

It was clear from this that the MNB needed to find a way to better represent its activities

to the disputing parties and to the local populace. The brigade could use direct coordination or information operations, but somehow all involved had to understand the purpose and scope of the mission, without compromising security.

I had discovered yet another lesson.

*In peacekeeping, coalition forces need transparency of operations to achieve unity of purpose.* Transparency in peace operations ensures that the parties involved are not surprised by peacekeeper actions, reducing the chance that parties to the dispute, and others, will misunderstand the actions and intentions of the force. This transparency can be achieved through direct coordination with the parties, the public, and civilian activities such as those conducted by Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs). In doing so, the coalition can achieve unity of purpose by fostering consensus within and beyond the organization.

Of course, transparency has to be balanced with the operational security necessary to protect the force. This can be done through the timing and method in which information is released. Further, transparency can actually add to force protection by eliminating unexpected conflicts with the disputing parties. Transparency protects the force by clearly portraying the intentions of the peace force to the parties to the agreement, as well other agencies and civilians who may not be fully aware of the nature of the agreement or the operations conducted to support it.

To achieve transparency, the MNB needed to make better use of its information assets, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, to provide the right information to the right audience at the right time. If the brigade chose to inform the public of its intention to step up the seizure of illegal weapons, and clearly portrayed those who trafficked or cached weapons as criminals, the brigade could potentially isolate the insurgents from at least a segment of their popular support, and reduce civilian and governmental interference. A similar approach produced positive results in Bosnia over a decade earlier. There, because the peace force could not interdict

the arms trafficking of the Mujahadeen due to a lack of mandate and capacity, they instead put their efforts in making the activity public, which ultimately reduced Mujahadeen activities in the region.<sup>24</sup>

As these lessons turned over repeatedly in my mind, a strange feeling came over me and I slipped into yet another dream.

## CHAPTER FIVE

# THE FOURTH DREAM

*"Losing an illusion makes you wiser than finding a truth."*


*- Ludwig Borne*

Once more I found myself in the confines of the brigade headquarters, having no recollection of my previous experiences but finding myself imbued with five clear lessons – unity of purpose, consensus planning, adaptive control, simplicity, and transparency – that I might apply as principles to the task that lay ahead. The coalition plans shop was running at full speed when I entered the plans shop and gathered the planners to share with them my newfound knowledge. Before long, we were hard at work, planning the seizure of illegal weapons caches as previously described.

Our intelligence collection efforts indicated that the Thracian Turks were disappointed by the failure of NATO to broker a deal between the Turkish and Greek governments. As a result, many were beginning to see the deployment of SFORTH as an attempt by the Greeks to delay settlement, and to continue their oppression of the ethnic Turks. More sympathetic members of the local populace had indicated that the Hizballah were attempting to recruit supporters in the Thrace, in hopes of creating a popular uprising that renew insurgent efforts against the government and laying the groundwork for conducting military operations against the SFORTH “collaborators”. The intelligence planners believed that popular support was still minimal but predicted that while most of the populace would not actively oppose our operation in Soufli, there would be a small segment of civilians who might try to prevent the SFORTH from carrying out the mission. We realized from this that a critical component of the mission planning had to focus on an information campaign to reinforce the legitimacy of SFORTH’s presence, and to remove popular support for the Hizballah and more militant members of the BT.

The ground actions planned in support of the weapons seizure were as described before, with a company of American infantry and two companies of Italian infantry seizing the three

weapons sites simultaneously, each supported by a platoon of carabinieri. As described previously, the plan tasked the Americans with seizing the weapons site in the north, Objective HOMER, and the Italians with seizing the other two, ODYSSEY in the east, and ILIAD in the south. The Pakistani infantry company organized as the QRF, with a platoon of U.S. MPs in support. The MNB headquarters supplied Greek linguists to each of the ground elements, while 1-6 Infantry Battalion was given linguists to support its command and control of the coalition the four companies. This arrangement ensured that there were redundant communications across the task force, dubbed Task Force Steel, as a hedge against problems that might arise from the language barrier.



**Figure 7. The fourth plan.**

The staff worked diligently to develop an information campaign designed to promote the SFORTH's actions, even before getting the specific mission to conduct the weapons seizures. The campaign would emphasize SFORTH efforts to maintain law and order in the area while portraying those who would conduct or support insurgent operations as criminals who were preventing both governments from finalizing a peace plan. This information operation was reinforced by information coming out of the peace talks that indicated that neither government

had been able to reach an agreement because of their concerns about internal security. SFORTH conducted interviews and provided press releases that reiterated that the SFORTH took the issue of violations to the Military Technical Agreement seriously, and that efforts to reduce these violations were being redoubled. The night before the Soufli operation, the SFORTH Commander conducted an interview on local television where he talked about the possibility that SFORTH would receive reinforcements in the future so that it could expand operations to enforce the weapons portions of the Military Technical Agreement.

The brigade submitted and received approval for modifications to the ROE that directly related to the conduct of limited peace enforcement missions, clearly addressing the rules and procedures for detaining suspects, the appropriate use of force, and the use of riot control agents. Persons would be detained only in connection with criminal activity, which included violations of the Military Technical Agreement, and interfering with SFORTH operations. SFORTH would turn all detainees over to the Joint Military Commission, who was charged with determining which detainees to turn over to the Greek or Turkish authorities for processing.

The staff developed a detailed and flexible plan that was consistent with the aims of the coalition contingents. It designed a Task Force that was capable of responding to a wide variety of contingencies while being small enough not to appear overbearing. The brigade had conducted an extensive information campaign to promote the legitimacy of the operation in order to ensure support by most of the local populace. The entire brigade approached the day of the operation with a quiet confidence, seeing indicators that the information campaign had begun to improve public perceptions about the SFORTH.

Again, I found myself in the brigade operations center on the morning of the planned operation. The entire staff was on tenterhooks, but none more so than the planning staff, who suffered from that familiar anxiety that comes from the fear that you have forgotten something as soldiers are sent to execute your plan.

Early that morning, as the infantry conducted their final preparations for the mission, the SFORTH headquarters contacted the Greek authorities and representatives of the humanitarian relief organizations operating in the Evros Prefecture to inform them that an operation was being mounted near Soufli. The COMSFORTH told the Greeks to keep EL.AS units out of the area for the remainder of the day. The relief organizations were told to delay any missions in the region until later in the day.

The three companies departed their cantonment areas shortly before 0700, moving on the routes as previously described, with support transports in trail. The 1-6 Infantry operations center controlled their movements to ensure a simultaneous raid on all three sites, while the QRF moved north to establish a position from which they could rapidly provide support to any of the three locations.

The Americans quickly cordoned the area around HOMER with their infantry platoons, while the carabinieri stormed the building in a fashion similar to any police raid, subduing the six suspects inside without a shot being fired. The transports rapidly moved in and within 30 minutes, all of the weapons and ammunition had been loaded. The company commander sent the carabinieri platoon and one infantry platoon to escort the transports back to the cantonment area, while the company-minus moved slowly along the main highway running south through Soufli, ready to assist either of the Italians in their operations to the south and east.

The Italians swiftly moved through Soufli from the west to conduct the raid at ODYSSEY, finding the area around the target building deserted, but a truck was idling behind the building. The carabinieri quickly entered the building, even as the infantry began to establish their cordon, and surprised nine suspects who were inside preparing to move some of the weapons stored in the building. A short gunfight ensued, in which two suspects and one of the carabinieri received minor wounds. One of the wounded suspects appeared to be a Turkish national, possibly a member of the Hizballah.

While two platoons continued to secure the perimeter, the third moved to load the transports and tend to the wounded. After securing more than 300 light and heavy weapons, 35 mortars, and 80 crates of munitions of various sorts, the Italians moved directly South on the main highway back to the cantonment area.

At ILIAD, things were also going smoothly. The building was located on a dead end, making it easy to secure. Two platoons quickly fanned out to surround the target while the carabinieri and one infantry platoon moved forward to clear the building forward. While the carabinieri and the infantry platoon worked their way through the large building, detaining six confused BT members, and confiscating more than 300 weapons, 35 mortars and 80 crates of ammunition, a small crowd began to gather outside. The company commander used his interpreter to explain to the people in the crowd that the company was there to seize illegal weapons, weapons that potentially posed a threat to them and their families. The crowd was more curious than menacing, but appeared not to be dissuaded by the commander's pleas for them to depart their area for their own safety.

As the carabinieri and the infantry began loading the transports, the commander called back to the Task Force Steel commander to inform him that a situation was potentially developing at ILIAD. The American company commander, moving South through Soufli, heard the report and volunteered to assist. The task force commander agreed, but advised the company to take only one platoon up the road to ILIAD so as not to give the appearance of over-reaction. The Italian commander advised the crowd that they needed to clear the road in order to allow his "escorts" to join the company.

When the mechanized infantry platoon arrived, the crowd indeed cleared the road and allowed the Italians column to depart. As they passed through the American platoon, the tracked vehicles turned and followed the Italian company back down to the main road where both moved quickly South to the cantonment area.

By 1130, the Task Force Steel was back in the cantonment area, having seized more than

800 weapons seized and almost 10 tons of ammunition in the morning's raids. In the process, the task force had also taken in 17 suspects and suffered only one wounded. The mission was a success and there was no shortage of congratulatory remarks among the members of the multinational brigade.

I too was happy about the outcome, but quickly retreated to my office to try to capture the five lessons that had led me to this day.

It was clear to me that coalition operations and coalition peace operations in particular, are shaped by the competing national policies, equipment and skill sets of the coalition contingents. As such, the "Jominian" principles that had shaped so much of my approach to my profession did not adequately address the conditions unique to coalition peace operations. Even the principles of MOOTW seemed to be more like a set of conditions than a methodology for achieving desired ends.

It was the five lessons, which are fundamentally principles of coalition peace operations, that brought about the conditions of objective, security, legitimacy, perseverance and restraint listed in the principles of MOOTW. By focusing on unity of purpose, developing consensus within the MNB staff, and maintaining transparency in the operation, the brigade had developed a unified objective, maintained the security of the force and of the operation, and sustained the legitimacy of SFORTH's presence in Thrace. The brigade maintained its perseverance and restraint through the development of simple plans and adaptive controls that leveraged the levels of training, equipment and capabilities of all the members of the coalition force.

The principles of war still had a place in peace operations, especially when conditions called for peace enforcement instead of peacekeeping. However, the five principles revealed in my lessons extended across the full spectrum of peace operations.

I suddenly felt a hand on my shoulder, presumably another staff member wanting to talk about the day's successes. Before I could turn to see who it was, the hand began shaking me vigorously. I suddenly opened my eyes to find the MNB commander standing in the aisle beside

me. It was a moment before the sleep cleared away from my mind and I realized that he was trying to tell me that the plane had landed and it was time to go brief the staff on the USEUCOM Commander's azimuth check.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup>David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, “Command Arrangements for Peace Operations” (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995, accessed 15 November, 2002), available at available online at <http://www.dodccrp.org/capohome.htm>; Internet.

<sup>2</sup> Copyright 2002, Central Intelligence Agency, available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/mapspub/maps/Turkey2002.htm>; Internet.

<sup>3</sup>Glenn E. Curtis, ed., *Greece: A Country Study*, 4<sup>th</sup> Ed ( Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), 282.

<sup>4</sup>Human Rights Watch reported on the persecution of the Turkish minority in the Western Thrace region of Greece. The report is a follow-up to previous reports and describes historical actions by the Greek government against their Turkish minority as well as steps taken to improve these human rights abuses. Christopher Panico. “Greece: The Turks of Western Thrace” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, accessed 22 November, 2002), available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/>; Internet.

<sup>5</sup>Curtis, 276.

<sup>6</sup>Cyprus is a longstanding source of tension in Greco-Turkish relations. When Cyprus gained its independence from Britain in 1960, an ethnic struggle between Greek and Turkish Cypriots quickly broke out. A Greek junta seized power in 1974, which ultimately lead to Turkey’s occupation of the northern portion of the island in an attempt to protect the Turkish Cypriots from predation by a Greek-dominated government. The tensions created by the *de facto* partition of Cyprus since that time have almost reached the point of armed confrontation, usually with regard to peripheral issues such as the status of maritime rights in the Aegean and dispute over ownership of a small island called Imia. Curtis, 274.

<sup>7</sup>Turkey’s terror group, Hizballah, is a Kurdish based organization and is not associated with Hezbollah, the well-known Lebanese terrorist organization.

<sup>8</sup>Literally, “Western Thrace”. Curtis’ *Country Study* describes the *Bati Trakya* as an militant organization, I did not find this organization listed on either the Department of State, or Central Intelligence Agency lists of terrorist organizations, 282.

<sup>9</sup>These fictitious actions are consistent with those described as taking place in the 1950s in Panico’s “Turks of Western Thrace”.

<sup>10</sup>Joint Publication 3-16 (Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations) defines three types of command structure in coalition operations: parallel, lead nation, and a combination of the two. It defines the lead nation command structure as:

A coalition of this makeup sees all coalition members subordinating their forces to a single partner. However, nations are generally reluctant to grant extensive control over their forces to one lead nation. Coalition counterparts are also sensitive to actions that might be construed as preferential to the lead nation’s interests. One means of ensuring that the HQ is representative of the entire coalition is to augment the HQ staff with representatives from the participating coalition members, such as designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This provides the coalition commander with representative leadership, a ready source of expertise on the capabilities of the respective coalition members, and facilitates the planning process. United States Department of Defense, *JP 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, (Washington DC: GPO, 2000), II-10.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid. II-11.

<sup>12</sup>Department of Defense, *JP3-07.3: Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1999), II-2.

<sup>13</sup>The High Security Administration Facility is fictitious but is a potential outcome of current detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay during an extended Global War on Terrorism.

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<sup>14</sup>Department of the Army, *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), 4-14. Unity of command is described as:

Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective. Cooperation may produce coordination, but giving a single commander the required authority unifies action. The joint, multinational, and interagency nature of unified action creates situations where the military commander does not directly control all elements in the AO. In the absence of command authority, commanders cooperate, negotiate, and build consensus to achieve unity of effort.

<sup>15</sup>Chapter two of *JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, identifies six principles for military operations other than war. They are:

Objective - Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective

Unity of Effort - Seek unity of effort in every operation

Security - Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage

Restraint - Apply appropriate military capability prudently

Perseverance - Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims

Legitimacy - Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable

Specifically, unity of effort is described as:

This MOOTW principle is derived from the principle of war, unity of command. It emphasizes the need for ensuring all means are directed to a common purpose. However, in MOOTW, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of international, foreign and domestic military and non-military participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective. This requires that JFCs, or other designated directors of the operation, rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort.

<sup>16</sup>This is the manual used by the UN to train officers in the planning and prep for peace operations. Philip R. Wilkinson and Richard J. Rinaldo, *Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations*, (New York: UNITAR POCI, 1996), 79-81.

<sup>17</sup>Larry Wentz. *Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience*, (Vienna, VA: DOD Command and Control Research Project, 2002), 431.

<sup>18</sup>Frederick H. Fleitz, Jr., *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s* (Westport, CT: Preager, 2002), 133; Harold E. Bullock, "Peace by Committee: Command and Control Issues in Multinational Peace Enforcement Operations." (Monograph, Maxwell Air Force Base, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1995), 14.

<sup>19</sup>Chapter Two of JP 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operation (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995) recommends functional coordination centers within multinational and coalition organizations to fully integrate those functions across the force.

<sup>20</sup>Alberts, et al.

<sup>21</sup>Bullock, 78.

<sup>22</sup>John T. Fischel, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998, 186.

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<sup>23</sup>Department of the Army, *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), 4-14. Surprise is described as:

Surprise is the reciprocal of security. Surprise results from taking actions for which an enemy or adversary is unprepared. It is a powerful but temporary combat multiplier. It is not essential to take the adversary or enemy completely unaware; it is only necessary that he become aware too late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed, information superiority, and asymmetry.

<sup>24</sup>Fischel, 126.

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